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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the welfare eﬀects of publicly provided health care in an
economy where the consumers have "present-biased" preferences due to quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. The analysis is based on a two-type model with asymmetric information be-
tween the government and the private sector, and each consumer lives for three periods.
We present formal conditions under which public provision to the young and middle-aged
generation, respectively, leads to higher welfare. Our results show that quasi-hyperbolic
discounting provides a strong incentive for public provision to the young generation;
especially if the consumers are naive (instead of sophisticated).
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There is now a considerable amount of research based on experiments suggesting that con-
sumers make dynamically inconsistent choices. The underlying behavioral failure is a self-
control problem caused by "present-biased" preferences, i.e. a tendency for the individual to
give less weight to the future welfare consequences of today’s actions than would be optimal
for the individual himself/herself in a longer time-perspective. A mechanism that generates
this behavior is quasi-hyperbolic discounting, where the individual, at any time t, attaches
a higher utility discount rate to tradeoﬀs between periods t and t + 1 than to similar trade-
oﬀs in the more distant future.1 The resulting self-control problem might be exempliﬁed by
a tendency to undersave or underinvest in health capital; both of which may have serious
welfare consequences.
The present paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model, where the consumers
suﬀer from a self-control problem generated by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The purpose
is to analyze the welfare eﬀects of publicly provided health care services, which exemplify
private goods provided by the public sector. We present two reasons as to why this is
interesting. First, as some of the beneﬁts to the individual of such investments are likely
to arise in the future (in the form of increased health capital), whereas the costs arise at
the time the investment is made, the appearance of quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies
that the investment made by the individual might become too small from the perspective
of his/her future preferences. Therefore, a paternalistic government may want to make sure
that agents reach an optimal level - or at least a minimum level - of health capital in a
longer time-perspective. Second, there is already a literature - albeit small - dealing with
optimal tax (or subsidy) responses to quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Gruber and Köszegi,
2004; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003, 2006; Aronsson and Thunström, 2008; Aronsson and
Sjögren, 2009), while there are no earlier studies on public provision of private goods in this
1Experimental evidence pointing in this direction can be found in, e.g., Thaler (1981), Kirby and Marakovic
(1997), Kirby (1997), Viscusi, Huber and Bell (2008) and Brown, Chua and Camerer (2009). In the latter
two studies, estimates of the "hyperbolic parameter" (referred to as "β" below) are in the interval 0.5 − 0.8
(instead of 1 as under exponential discounting). See also Fredrick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) for a
review of empirical research on intertemporal choice, and Rubenstein (2003) for a critical view of the evidence
for hyperbolic discounting.
1particular context. Our study serves to bridge this gap by considering the supplemental role
of publicly provided health care services when the income tax is optimal. The only related
study that we are aware of - dealing with public provision of private goods under optimal
income taxation in an economy where agents suﬀer from bounded rationality - is Pirttilä
and Tenhunen (2008), which is based on a static model combined with a "non-welfarist"
approach, where the objective function of the government diﬀers from that faced by the
consumers (for whatever reason). In Section 3 below, we compare our results with those
derived by Pirttilä and Tenhunen.
To be more speciﬁc, we develop an overlapping generations (OLG) model, in which the
consumers diﬀer in ability, where ability is private information, and where each consumer
lives for three periods (the minimum number of periods required to analyze the consequences
of quasi-hyperbolic discounting). Following Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982), we simplify the
analysis by considering a framework with two ability-types. The instantaneous utility facing
each consumer depends on the current consumption of a numeraire good, the use of leisure,
and the stock of health capital2, respectively, where the latter accumulates via the consump-
tion of a speciﬁc private good referred to as "health care" in what follows. Furthermore, we
allow the two ability-types to diﬀer with respect to the preference for "immediate gratiﬁca-
tion". The policy instruments faced by the government are nonlinear taxes on labor income
and capital income as well as publicly provided health care, which the consumers may "top
up" via private purchases. Therefore, the present study also relates to earlier literature on
public provision of private goods under asymmetric information between the government and
the private sector, where publicly provided private goods are tools - in addition to the income
tax - for relaxation of the self-selection constraint (that places restraint on redistribution pol-
icy).3 While this earlier literature is typically based on static models, we extend the analysis
to a dynamic model to be able to capture the policy incentives following from a dynamically
inconsistent preference structure. The two-type model constitutes a simple - yet powerful -
framework for studying corrective and redistributive aspects of public policy simultaneously;
an approach which is arguably realistic in the sense that a government attempting to correct
2By describing health as a capital concept, our model bears some resemblance to the classical health
economics model developed by Grossman (1972).
3See e.g. Blomquist and Christiansen (1995, 1998) and Boadway and Marchand (1995).
2for a behavioral failure may also want to redistribute in the most eﬃcient way.
Earlier studies dealing with quasi-hyperbolic discounting often distinguish between naive
and sophisticated consumers.4 At any time, a naive consumer erroneously expects to be time-
consistent in the future, meaning that he/she may have an incentive to revise the optimal plan
in each subsequent period. A sophisticated consumer, on the other hand, recognizes that the
self-control problem also arises in future periods, and implements a plan that his/her future
selves will follow (see, e.g., Laibson 1997). We consider both naivety and sophistication in
what follows, which is important for at least two reasons. First, it is not a priori clear whether
agents in real world economies are better described by naivety than sophistication or vice
versa.5 Second, the distinction between naivety and sophistication matters for the optimal
public provision of health care; to be more speciﬁc, the policy rule derived under naivety is
a technical special case of the corresponding policy rule associated with sophistication.
Our study is closely related to a paper by Aronsson and Sjögren (2009), which deals with
optimal mixed taxation (i.e. the optimal combination of income and commodity taxation)
under asymmetric information, in an economy where the consumers suﬀer from the same
kind of self-control problem as in the present study. Therefore, as the implications of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting for optimal taxation are analyzed at some length in their study, we
focus on public provision here. The outline of the study is as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and characterizes the outcome of private optimization, where a distinction is made
between naive and sophisticated consumers. In Section 3, we present the cost beneﬁt rules
for public provision of health care to the young and middle-aged generation, respectively, as
well as relate these policy rules to whether the consumers are characterized by naivety or
sophistication. The results are summarized and discussed in Section 4.
4See O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for an excellent article about the distinction between naivety and
sophistication.
5To our knowledge, the empirical evidence here is scarce. Although in a diﬀerent context than ours,
Hey and Lotito (2009) analyze dynamically inconsistent decision-making, and distinguish between naive,
sophisticated and resolute agents. The latter category, which is not represented in our study, means that
agents do not let their inconsistency aﬀect their behavior, i.e. the agents stick to a plan that is best from an
ex-ante perspective. Based on data from an experiment, the authors ﬁnd that the majority of agents were
either naive or resolute (with slightly more agents being naive), whereas sophistication was a less common
strategy.
32 The Model
The production side of the model follows the bulk of earlier literature on optimal taxation
and public provision of private goods under asymmetric information in assuming that the
output is produced by a linear technology. This means that the producer prices and factor
prices (before-tax hourly wage rates and interest rate) are ﬁxed in each period, although not
necessarily constant over time.
Turning to the consumption side, we assume that each consumer lives for three periods:
works in the ﬁrst and second, and is retired in the third. The consumers diﬀer with respect
to productivity and can be divided in two ability-types: a low-ability type (denoted by
superindex 1) earning wage rate w1 and a high-ability type (denoted by superindex 2) earning
wage rate w2 > w1. For simplicity, we abstract from population growth and normalize the
number of consumers of each ability-type and generation to one. The instantaneous utility
functions facing ability-type i (i = 1,2) of generation t - who is young in period t, middle-aged

















where c denotes the consumption of a numeraire good, z leisure and h the stock of health
capital. Leisure is deﬁned as a time endowment,
_
l, less the time spent in market work, l.
Subindices 0, 1 and 2 indicate that the consumer is young, middle-aged and old, respec-
tively. The functions v(·) and f(·) are increasing in their arguments, strictly concave and all
goods are assumed to be normal. For simplicity, we assume that the instantaneous utility is
additively separable in the health capital stock.
The concept of present-biased preferences is operationalized by using the approach de-
veloped by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and later used by, for example, Laibson (1997) and









where Θj = 1/(1 + θ)
j is a conventional (exponential) utility discount factor with utility dis-
count rate θ, whereas β
i ∈ (0,1) is a type-speciﬁc time-inconsistent preference for immediate
gratiﬁcation.6
Our concern is to analyze whether the disincentive to invest in health capital due to quasi-
hyperbolic discounting may justify public provision of health care services. As a consequence,
we focus attention on the intertemporal aspects of such investments, by assuming that the
investment in health capital (i.e. the use of health care services) in period t aﬀects the
stock of health capital in period t + 1, while disregarding any atemporal (within-period)
relationship between the use of health care services and the stock of health capital. The
health capital stock facing the young ability-type i is ﬁxed at hi
0,t. For the middle-aged and









where δ ∈ (0,1) is a depreciation factor - deﬁned as "one minus the depreciation rate" - while
mi
0,t and mi
1,t+1 are the ﬂow-services of health care used by the young and middle-aged selves.
We have simpliﬁed by assuming a linear relationship between the use of ﬂow-services of health
care and the health capital stock in the next period. The same qualitative results as those
derived below will also apply in a more general model where the marginal eﬀect of m is
decreasing.
Flow-services of health care may be privately purchased on the market or publicly pro-
vided free of charge; each consumer may, therefore, "top up" the level that the government
provides via his/her own private purchases. This means that the ﬂow-services of health
care used by the young consumer can be characterized as mi
0,t = g0,t+ xi
0,t, where g0,t is
the amount publicly provided and xi
0,t the private purchase. An analogous deﬁnition apply
for the middle-aged. Notice that the government is not allowed to provide diﬀerent levels
6It would add no important insight into the consequences of quasi-hyperbolic discounting if we were to
assume that the conventional utility discount factor diﬀers between ability-types.
5of health care to the two ability-types; an assumption which is in accordance with earlier
comparable literature on publicly provided private goods, although it may target diﬀerent
age-groups diﬀerently. Throughout the paper, we assume that health care services cannot
be resold.












1,t+1rt+2 denote the capital income facing the middle-aged
and old, respectively. There are no bequests here; the initial endowment of capital by each
young consumer is zero. Using this notation, the income tax payment for each of the three




















The individual budget constraint is then given by
yi


















where the prices of c and x have been normalized to one. Notice that the old consumer does
not invest in health capital in our model, since there would be no future beneﬁt associated
with such investments.
2.1 Consumer choices
As mentioned above, it is not a priori clear how the consumers deal with their self-control
problems, and we shall, therefore, make a distinction between naivety and sophistication.
In the former case, the consumer does not recognize that his/her future selves are faced
by the same self-control problem as the current self, whereas sophistication means that each
consumer implements a time-consistent plan that his/her future selves will follow. As we show
below, this means that the young sophisticated consumer will act as strategic leader vis-a-vis
his/her middle-aged self. In technical terms, naivety is a special case of sophistication in
the sense that the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and savings that a naive consumer
6obeys are special cases of those obeyed by a sophisticated consumer. Therefore, to shorten
the presentation as much as possible, we use sophistication as a reference case and then
discuss how the ﬁrst order conditions simplify in the special case of naivety.
Also, as the sophisticated consumer implements a time-consistent consumption/savings
plan, we begin by analyzing the behavior of the middle-aged generation and then continue
with the young generation. For the middle-aged, there is no technical distinction between
naivety and sophistication. The reason is, of course, that the old self does not make any
forward-looking decisions, implying that the middle-aged self has no direct incentive to mod-
ify the behavior of the old self. In fact, in the model described above, the old generation
makes no active decision; each old consumer just uses his/her remaining assets for consump-
tion. We have used this particular set up for simplicity, as the possible (atemporal) trade-oﬀs
faced by the elderly are not aﬀected by discounting.
2.1.1 Decisions Made by the Middle-Aged Generation
Following earlier literature on optimal nonlinear taxation under asymmetric information,
the consumer-choices are analyzed in two stages; in the ﬁrst, we derive commodity demand
functions (for c and x) conditional on the hours of work and savings; in the second, we derive
the labor supply and savings functions. The reason for using this particular approach is that
the conditional demand functions will be useful in the policy-problem presented below.
For the middle-aged, the ﬁrst stage problem means choosing c and x to maximize the
objective represented by equation (4) subject to the nonnegativity constraint xi
1,t+1 ≥ 0; the








where b is ﬁxed net income adjusted for savings (see below). By substituting equations
(10)-(11) into the utility function and using that ∂hi
2,t+2/∂xi
1,t+1 = 1, we can then write the














1,t+1 ≤ 0; (12)
xi
1,t+1Ai
1,t+1 = 0. (13)
In the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (12) and (13), the self-control problem shows up as an ad-
justment of the weight attached to the future marginal utility of health capital (through the
parameter β
i).









0,t + g0,t)δ + g1,t+1
￿
for n = c,x. (14)
Equation (14) relates the demand (for the numeraire good and private health care services)
by the middle-aged consumer to his/her current levels of disposable income (adjusted for
savings) and leisure, as well as to the level of publicly provided health care to the middle-
aged and the total past consumption of health care services (publicly provided as well as
privately purchased). Equation (14) is also a reaction function, as it describes how the
young consumer can inﬂuence the consumption choices made by his/her middle-aged self.
The labor supply and savings behavior of the middle-aged consumer is analyzed by choos-
ing li
1,t+1 and si
1,t+1 to maximize ui
1,t+1 + β
iΘui
2,t+2 subject to the health capital function
(6), the conditional demand functions (14), and the following budget constraint:
bi
1,t+1 = si







1,t+1 (1 + rt+2) − Ti
2,t+2. (16)

















, the ﬁrst order conditions for hours of



























Since quasi-hyperbolic discounting does not distort the atemporal tradeoﬀ between consump-
tion and leisure, equation (17) is a standard labor supply condition. Equation (18) shows that
the middle-aged consumer saves less than he/she would have done without quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, i.e. where β
i = 1. Equations (17) and (18) imply the following labor supply
and saving functions (in which variables other than those decided upon by the consumer’s



















By analogy to equation (14) above, equations (19) and (20) are also interpretable as reaction
functions, showing how the young consumer may inﬂuence the labor supply and savings
behavior of his/her middle-aged self.
2.1.2 Decisions Made by the Young Generation
Turning to the young generation, the distinction between naivety and sophistication becomes
important. As we mentioned above, a sophisticated consumer recognized that the self-control
problem will also appear in future periods, and the young sophisticated consumer will act
strategically to inﬂuence the incentives faced by his/her middle-aged self. This motive for
strategic behavior is absent under naivety (as the young naive consumer erroneously expects
the self-control problem to vanish in the future). In the following, we derive the optimality
conditions obeyed by sophisticated consumer, and then explain how these conditions simplify
under naivety.











is the intertemporal objective that the young consumer would like his/her middle-aged self




2,t+2). In particular, note that equation (22) does not contain the parameter β
i.
To derive conditional demand functions for the numeraire good and health care services,
we maximize equation (21) with respect to ci
0,t and xi
0,t subject to equations (5)-(6), (10)-(11),


























































































0,t ≤ 0; (24)
xi
0,tAi








1,t+1) measures the change






1,t+1) is the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between leisure and the numeraire good faced by the consumer’s middle-aged self.
10The ﬁrst row of (24) - which is analogous to (12) faced by the middle-aged agent -
comprises the marginal eﬃciency condition for xi
0,t that would characterize a young naive
consumer, whereas the additional second, third and fourth rows are due to sophistication
and show how the young consumer will adjust his/her consumption of health care services to
inﬂuence the consumption, savings and labor supply decisions made by his/her middle-aged




: the intuition is
that the middle-aged individual discounts his/her future utility by the discount factor β
iΘ,
whereas the young self wants the middle-aged self to use the discount factor Θ. The reason as
to why the second, third and fourth rows vanish under naivety is that a naive consumer has
no incentive to aﬀect the choices made by his/her middle-aged self, as the naive consumer
erroneously expects not to be subject to this self-control problem in the future. Another - yet
related - diﬀerence between naivety and sophistication, therefore, is that the naive consumer
underestimates the future marginal utility of health (as he/she overestimates the future stock
of health capital).
Note that the variables xi
1,t+1, si
1,t+1, and li
1,t+1 are decided upon simultaneously by
the middle-aged consumer, and the eﬀect that an increase xi
0,t will have on each of these
variables is, in general, ambiguous. For purposes of interpretation, we will, nevertheless,
discuss a possible scenario. First, note that the partial derivative ∂xi
1,t+1/∂xi
0,t ∈ (−δ,0) is
likely to be relatively large in absolute value, as increased consumption of health care services
when young leads to a lower marginal utility of health capital when middle-aged and old,
ceteris paribus.7 Second, if lower expenditures on health care services when middle-aged (due
to an increase in xi
0,t) means increased saving and increased expenditure on the numeraire
good - and with li
1,t+1 held constant - we have ∂si
1,t+1/∂xi
0,t ∈ (0,− ∂xi
1,t+1/∂xi
0,t). The
intuition is that the stock of health capital does not directly aﬀect the ﬁrst order condition
for si
1,t+1. In this hypothetical - let be plausible - scenario, the second and third row of (24)
will sum to a negative number, i.e.













0,tδ) ∈ (−1,0). Therefore, ∂xi
1,t+1/∂xi






























This discussion suggests that the second and third rows of (24) contribute to reduce xi
0,t,
ceteris paribus; a choice made by the young consumer to induce his/her middle-aged self
to increase the consumption of health care services. This incentive may, in turn, either be
reinforced or counteracted by the fourth row of (24); the sign of which depends on whether
the use of health care services by the middle-aged self is complementary with, or substitutable
for, leisure, i.e. whether ∂˜ xi
1,t+1/∂zi
1,t+1 is positive or negative, and how an increase in xi
0,t
aﬀects the hours of work supplied by the middle-aged ability type i. If the nonnegativity
constraint does not bind, equations (23) and (25) imply the following conditional demand












for n = c,x. (27)
As mentioned in the introduction, although the present study presupposes that the income
taxes are optimally chosen, we do not discuss income tax policy in what follows. Therefore,
to shorten the presentation, we present the ﬁrst order conditions for labor supply and savings
faced by the young consumer in the Appendix, as these conditions will not be used in the
study of costs and beneﬁts of publicly provided health care.
3 Public Provision of Health Care
The government aims at redistributing as well as correcting for the self-control problem
discussed above. We assume that β
1 = β
2 = 1 from the perspective of the (paternalistic)
government,8 and that the government faces a utilitarian social welfare function. Therefore,








8This assumption is in line with earlier comparable literature; see, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003,
2006), Aronsson and Thunström (2008) and Aronsson and Sjögren (2009).
12Therefore, as the consumers are assumed to discount the future hyperbolically, equation (28)
diﬀers from the corresponding utility function faced by the young ability-type i of generation
t, Ui
































where Kt is the capital stock at the beginning of period t, which depends on savings in
period t − 1. Since the government can make lump-sum payments between periods as well
as control the capital stock via the nonlinear income taxes, it is not necessary to include
the government’s budget constraint in the public decision-problem, given that the resource
constraint is included (Atkinson and Sandmo 1980, Pirttilä and Tuomala 2001).
We make the conventional assumptions about information: the government can observe
income, whereas ability is private information. We follow much earlier literature in con-
centrating a normal case, where the government wants to redistribute from the high-ability
to the low-ability type. As a consequence, one would like to prevent the high-ability type
from pretending to be a low-ability type, i.e. becoming a mimicker. This is accomplished
by imposing a self-selection constraint, implying that the high-ability type (at least weakly)
prefers the combination of disposable income and hours of work intended for him/her over
the combination intended for the low-ability type.
Note that the hours of work that the high-ability type needs to supply in order to reach

















1,t+1 when middle-aged. In the same way as for the true
low and high-ability types, we can, if the non-negative constraints for x do not bind, deﬁne



















0,t + g0,t)δ + g1,t+1
￿




l − ￿ l2
0,t and ￿ z2
1,t+1 =
_
l − ￿ l2
1,t+1. The mimicker receives the same labor and
capital income as the low-ability type. However, as the mimicker is more productive than the
low-ability type, the mimicker spends more time on leisure, meaning that equations (31) and
(32) generally diﬀer from the corresponding conditional demand functions faced by the low-
ability type. This means, in turn, that the mimicker and the low-ability type have diﬀerent
health capital stocks when middle-aged and old, respectively, even if their initial stocks were
to coincide.








j,t+j ≥ ￿ U2







where the deﬁnitions of ￿ u2
j,t+j for j = 0,1,2, are analogous to those for true low- and high-
ability types given by equations (1)-(3).
If deﬁned conditional on the publicly provided private good (the cost beneﬁt rule for which






i = 1,2) and Kt for all t to maximize the social welfare function given by equation (29),
subject to the accumulation equations for health capital (5)-(6), the self-selection constraint
(33), the resource constraint (30), and the conditional demand functions (14),(27) and (31)-
(32).9
9As the government is equipped with nonlinear taxes on labor and capital income by assumption, it is
able to implement any desired combination of work hours and disposable income for each ability-type and
generation, as well as an optimal path for the capital stock, subject to the self-selection, health capital and
resource constraints. Following earlier literature on optimal nonlinear taxation in dynamic economies, it is,
therefore, convenient to write the second best problem as a direct decision-problem where the government (or
social planner) directly decides upon work hours and disposable income for each ability-type and generation
as well as the capital stock. The marginal income tax structure that implements the second best resource
allocation can then be derived by combining the ﬁrst order conditions characterizing the second best problem
with those faced by the consumers.
14The Lagrangean corresponding to this policy problem is presented in the Appendix to-
gether with the associated ﬁrst order conditions reﬂecting an optimal income tax policy
implemented for generation t. Our concern is then to analyze the welfare eﬀects of publicly
provided health care given that the income taxes are optimal. Note that there is a potential
time-inconsistency problem here, since the government may have an incentive to change its
announced policies after that the consumers have revealed their abilities (which they do at
the end of the ﬁrst period of life given the appropriate incentives). Although we recognize
this potential problem, we follow the bulk of earlier literature on optimal nonlinear income
taxation in dynamic models in assuming that the government can credibly commit to the
announced tax and expenditure policies.10
We start by analyzing public provision of health care to the young generation and then
continue with public provision to the middle-aged.
3.1 Public Provision to the Young
To facilitate comparison with earlier research, we begin by brieﬂy discussing public provision
under the assumption that the consumers do not discount the future hyperbolically, i.e.
behave as if β
i = 1. We will then return to the assumption that the consumers behave
as if β
i < 1 and examine the welfare eﬀect of publicly provided health care to the young
generation under naivety as well as sophistication.
3.1.1 Without Hyperbolic Discounting




10See, e.g., Brett (1997), Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001), Aronsson et al. (2009) and Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (in press). Situations where the government implements a time-consistent policy without commit-





































1,t+1, respectively, responds to a tax-ﬁnanced increase in g0,t. The
responses by the mimicker are analogous. Then, if β
1 = β
2 = 1, we show in the Appendix


































































































As we assume away quasi-hyperbolic discounting here, the consumer objective, Ui
0,t, becomes
equal to the individual contribution to the social welfare function, V i
0,t, for each ability-type.
Note ﬁrst that an increase in g0,t aﬀects the instantaneous utility via the consumption of
health care services both when young and when middle-aged, i.e. via mi
0,t and mi
1,t+1,
respectively, which explains the ﬁrst row of equation (34). The second and third rows appear
because a change in g0,t aﬀects the self-selection constraint via the consumption of health
care services by the young high-ability type and young mimicker (the second row), and via
the consumption of health care services by the middle-aged high-ability type and middle-aged
mimicker (the third row).
Equation (34) is just an intertemporal analogue to, and has the same interpretation as,
formulas derived in earlier literature. If g0,t is small enough to imply that the nonnegativity
constraint attached to xi
0,t does not bind, then the ﬁrst term within brackets on the right

























16Analogous results apply for the young mimicker if ￿ x2
0,t > 0, as well as for the middle-aged
true ability-types (if xi
1,t+1 > 0, for i = 1,2) and the middle-aged mimicker (if ˆ x2
1,t+1 > 0),
respectively. Furthermore, with xi
0,t > 0, it also follows that dmi




0,t = 0, simply because each consumer adjusts his/her own private consumption of
health care services such that the total consumption remains unchanged.
As g0,t continues to increase, one of the nonnegativity constraints will eventually become
binding. For instance, at the point where the young ability-type i becomes crowded out,
we have ∂V i
0,t/∂mi
0,t − ∂V i
0,t/∂ci
0,t < 0 and dmi
0,t/dg0,t = 1, meaning that the ﬁrst term
on the right hand side of equation (34) contributes to lower welfare (as ability-type i is
forced to consume more health care services than he/she prefers). Similarly, if the young
mimicker becomes crowded out, then the second term in the second row contributes to higher
welfare, i.e. −λt[∂ ˆ V 2
0,t/∂ ˆ m2
0,t − ∂ˆ V 2
0,t/∂ˆ c2
0,t] > 0. The intuition is that decreased utility for
the mimicker leads to a relaxation of the self-selection constraint. The components referring
to the middle-aged in equation (34) have analogous interpretations. In other words, public
provision is welfare improving if the mimicker becomes crowded out ﬁrst, which is analogous
to results derived in earlier literature on public provision of private goods under optimal
income taxation.
Note ﬁnally that the consumers may adjust their consumption also in the intertemporal
dimension: if the young consumer becomes crowded out, this eﬀect is partly oﬀset via ad-
justments made by the middle-aged self, given that the nonnegativity constraint faced by
the middle-aged self does not bind. As will be explained in greater detail below, this reduces
the size of the welfare eﬀect, although it does not change the qualitative result.
3.1.2 Naive Consumers with Present-Biased Preferences
If the consumers have present-biased preferences, we show in the Appendix that the analogue


































































































Notice that, if the consumers have present-biased preferences, the objective function facing
ability-type i, Ui
0,t, will diﬀer from his/her contribution to the social welfare function, V i
0,t.
Note also that the components of the cost beneﬁt rule that are associated with the self-
selection constraint - the second and third rows - reﬂect the actual consumer-objective (not




g0,t = 0. We can then derive the following result from equation (36);
Proposition 1 If the consumers have present-biased preferences and are naive, there exists
a level of g0,t > 0 for which the welfare is strictly higher than without public provision.
The proof of Proposition 1 is straight forward. Suppose ﬁrst that g0,t is small enough
to imply xi
0,t > 0 and xi
1,t+1 > 0. This means that the ﬁrst row of equation (36) is zero,
because dmi
0,t/dg0,t = 0 and dmi
1,t+1/dg0,t = 0 (as in the absence of the self-control problem),
because the consumer adjusts his/her private consumption of health care services to maintain
the total consumption of health care services at the optimal level. However, the terms
within parenthesis are no longer equal to zero, since the self-control problem discussed here














































Therefore, at the point where the nonnegativity constraint becomes binding we have
dmi
0,t/dg0,t = 1, which in combination with equation (37) means that welfare increases via
18the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (36). This welfare increase is, in turn, partly
(yet not fully) oﬀset by the intertemporal adjustment made by the middle-aged self when
xi
0,t = 0. To see this, note that dmi
1,t+1/dg0,t = ∂xi
1,t+1/∂g0,t if xi
0,t = 0. We can then write



















































which is positive even if ∂xi
1,t+1/∂g0,t approaches −δ.11 Therefore, although the intertem-
poral adjustment eﬀect reduces the gain of public provision, it does not eliminate it. Note
ﬁnally that if the middle-aged self is crowded out ﬁrst, so xi
1,t+1 = 0, then dmi
1,t+1/dg0,t = 0
and the (negative) intertemporal adjustment eﬀect vanishes.
It is now straight forward to see that Proposition 1 applies. If the low-ability type is
crowded out ﬁrst, the welfare gain is given by equation (39) above. If, on the other hand, the
mimicker is crowded out ﬁrst, there is a welfare gain due to relaxation of the self-selection
constraint (as discussed in the previous subsection). However, if we were to assume that
the high-ability type is crowded out ﬁrst, we have two counteracting eﬀects; a welfare gain
described by equation (39) and a welfare loss due to a tighter self-selection constraint.
3.1.3 Sophisticated Consumers with Present-Biased Preferences
Note that equation (36) provides a general characterization of the welfare eﬀect of increased
public provision, and is written on a format that applies irrespective of whether the consumers
are naive or sophisticated. However, the signs of the expressions in parentheses (i.e. the
diﬀerence between the marginal utility of health care and the marginal utility of numeraire
consumption) may clearly depend on the distinction between naivety and sophistication.
To see this, we may rewrite the young consumer’s ﬁrst order condition for health care
services as follows (given that xi
0,t > 0);
11To see that ∂xi
1,t+1/∂g0,t > −δ, recall from equation (14) that ∂xi
























0,t = 0 (40)
where Γi
0,t = 0 under naivety (as the young naive consumer does not act strategically vis-a-vis





























































is generally nonzero under sophistication and reﬂects an incentive faced by the young con-
sumer to aﬀect choices made by his/her middle-aged self. We can then derive the following




Proposition 2 If the consumers have present-biased preferences and are sophisticated, and
if Γ1
0,t ≤ 0, there exists a level of g0,t > 0 for which the welfare is strictly higher than without
public provision.



























0,t > 0, if Γi
0,t ≤ 0. (42)
Note that Γi
0,t ≤ 0 is a suﬃcient - not necessary - condition for the right hand side of equation
(42) to be positive. As a consequence, the qualitative result indicated by Proposition 2 also
applies if Γ1
0,t > 0 and small enough in absolute value.
By comparison with the cost beneﬁt rule for public provision derived in the previous
subsection, it follows that the strategic incentive faced by the young sophisticated consumer
may either strengthen or counteract the result presented in Proposition 1. As we indicated in
Section 2, the ﬁrst and second row of equation (41) may under reasonable assumptions sum
20to a negative number. In that case, and if the third row of equation (41) is either negative or
small in absolute value, then Γi





0; e.g., if leisure is substitutable for health care and li




0,t is close enough to zero.
Another interesting example as to when the right hand side of equation (42) is positive
is where the nonnegativity constraint faced by each middle-aged self binds at a lower level of
g0,t than the corresponding nonnegativity constraint faced by the young self, meaning that
equation (36) should be evaluated for x1
1,t+1 = x2
1,t+1 = ˆ x1
1,t+1 = 0. In this case, the right
hand side of equation (41) is equal to zero. The intuition is that if xi
1,t+1 = 0 - and with
si
0,t (which the government controls via the income tax system) held constant - there is no
channel via which xi
0,t may aﬀect the ﬁrst order conditions for li
1,t+1 and si
1,t+1 presented in
equations (17) and (18). This means that the policy rule for public provision takes the same
form as under naivety.
As we mentioned in the introduction, Pirttilä and Tenhunen (2008) have also examined
paternalistic motives for publicly provided private goods under optimal income taxation.
Their study is based on a static model where the objective of the social planner diﬀers from
the objective faced by the consumers. They ﬁnd that it is welfare improving to publicly
provide a private good that is "undervalued" by the consumers (in the sense that the social
marginal willingness to pay exceeds the private marginal willingness to pay), if this good is
either substitutable for leisure (in which case the mimicker is crowded out before the low-
ability type) or if leisure is weakly separable from the other goods in the utility function.
Although this result has important similarities to our Proposition 1 above, an important
diﬀerence is that we also ﬁnd that public provision might be welfare improving if the low-
ability type is crowded out ﬁrst. In a way similar to our study, Pirttilä and Tenhunen also
give an example where the consumers attach less value to their future health than preferred
by the government (which they interpret as hyperbolic discounting); yet, as they use a static
model, they are unable to distinguish between naivety and sophistication and, therefore,
identify how the strategic incentives faced by the consumers aﬀect the policy incentives
underlying publicly provided private goods. Furthermore, a static model does not capture
intertemporal consumption-adjustments over the individual life-cycle. As we indicated above,
21it matters for the welfare eﬀect of public provision to the young generation whether or not
the individual’s young self becomes crowded out before his/her middle-aged self. These
intertemporal adjustments will be even more important in the context of public provision to
the middle-aged, to which we turn next.
3.2 Public Provision to the Middle-Aged
Without hyperbolic discounting, the conditions under which public provision of health care to
the middle-aged leads to higher welfare are analogous to those described for public provision
towards the young generation above. Therefore, we only examine the policy rule for public
provision under quasi-hyperbolic discounting here.



































denote how the total consumption of health care services by ability-type i, when young
and when middle-aged, is aﬀected by a tax-ﬁnanced increase in the provision of health care
services to the middle-aged, g1,t+1. We show in the Appendix that the cost beneﬁt rule for


































































































By analogy to the analysis of public provision to the young generation carried out above, we
assume here that x2
1,t+1 > x1
1,t+1, ˆ x2
1,t+1 without any public provision of health care. We can
then use equation (43) to derive the following result;
22Proposition 3 When the consumers have present-biased preferences, and irrespective of
whether they are characterized by naivety or sophistication, there exists a level of g1,t+1 > 0
for which the welfare is strictly higher than without public provision, if the young generation
is crowded out before the middle-aged generation.
To see this result more clearly, suppose that all young agents have become crowded at
g∗
1,t+1, meaning that dm1
0,t/dg1,t+1 = dm2
0,t/dg1,t+1 = dˆ m2
0,t/dg1,t+1 = 0 for g1,t+1 ≥ g∗
1,t+1.
Then, if the middle-aged low-ability type becomes crowded out at, say, g∗∗
1,t+1 > g∗
1,t+1, and
if the middle-aged mimicker is not yet crowded out at this point, meaning that ˆ x2
1,t+1 > 0 at
g1,t+1 = g∗∗



























By analogy, if the middle-aged mimicker becomes crowded out before the middle-aged low-



















as crowding out here means ∂￿ U2
0,t/∂ ￿ m2
1,t+1 − ∂￿ U2
0,t/∂￿ c2
1,t+1 < 0 and d￿ m2
1,t+1/dg1,t+1 = 1.
The intuition as to why these results apply both under naivety and sophistication is, of
course, that the welfare eﬀect of public provision is governed solely by the instantaneous
utility change and behavioral response associated with the middle-aged low-ability type or
mimicker. Sophistication only gives rise to a strategic motive faced by the young consumers
(not the middle-aged), which are already crowded out by assumption.
On the other hand, if each middle-aged consumer is crowded out before his/her young
self, Proposition 3 does no longer apply. In that case, dmi
1,t+1/dg1,t+1 = 1 and dmi
0,t/dg1,t+1
is (most likely) negative at the point where the middle-aged ability-type i is crowded out,
suggesting that the ﬁrst row on the right hand side of equation (43) can be either positive or
negative. Then, if g1,t+1 continues to increase, and we eventually reach the point where the





1,t+1 switches sign from positive to negative. As a consequence, the
welfare eﬀect of public provision remains ambiguous here.
23It is worth noticing that, although Proposition 3 applies both for naive and sophisticated
consumers, the distinction between naivety and sophistication is still important for the out-
come. Whether or not the consumers are ﬁrst crowded out when young instead of when
middle-aged (meaning that the condition on which Proposition 3 is based will apply) might
depend on whether they are naive or sophisticated. In Section 2, we gave some intuition
as to why the young sophisticated consumer may reduce his/her own investment in health
care to provide incentives for his/her middle-aged self to spend more resources on health
care services. Alternatively, a young naive consumer may spend less resources on health care
services than a young sophisticated consumer, simply because the naive consumer under-
estimates his/her future marginal utility of health capital. These two mechanisms work in
opposite directions. It is, therefore, inconclusive whether the condition in Proposition 3 is
more likely to apply for naive than sophisticated consumers or vice versa.12
Finally, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 together give a strong argument for public provision of
health care services both to the young and middle-aged. To see this, note that an increase
in g0,t up to the point where the young low-ability type or mimicker is crowded out makes it
more likely that the condition for welfare improving public provision to the middle-aged in
Proposition 3 is fulﬁlled, if the middle-aged generation is not yet crowded out.
4 Summary and Discussion
This paper develops an OLG model with two ability-types, where the consumers suﬀer from a
self-control problem generated by quasi-hyperbolic discounting, to analyze the welfare eﬀects
of publicly provided health care services. Health care exempliﬁes a private good with an
12Note also that when a sophisticated consumer becomes crowded out as middle-aged, his/her strategic
motives to hold down the investment in health care when young will vanish. As a consequence, it is possible
that he/she may actually increase the investment when young in response to being crowded out as middle-
aged. Therefore, even thought it seems likely that the eﬀect that mi
1,t+1 has on the future marginal utility of
health is more important for the choice of xi
0,t than the strategic incentive, this mechanism will, nevertheless,
prevent us from concluding that dxi
0,t/dg1,t+1 = dmi
0,t/dg1,t+1 < 0. In addition, it is possible that naive
consumers will not alter their consumption choices when young in response to being crowded out as middle-
aged. The reason is that a young naive consumer erroneously expects his/her middle-aged self to demand
more health care services than the middle-aged self actually does.
24explicit intertemporal dimension: the beneﬁts (or at least some of them) following the use of
such services are likely to arise in the future in the form of increased health capital, while the
cost arises at the time the investment is made. Therefore, the appearance of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting means that the investment made by the individual might be too small from the
perspective of his/her future preferences, which provides a paternalistic motive for public
provision. The policy instruments faced by the government are nonlinear taxes on labor
income and capital income as well as the expenditures associated with publicly provided
health care. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study dealing with publicly provided private
goods under quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
In our model, each consumer lives for three periods, which allows us to distinguish be-
tween public provision to the young and the middle-aged as well as between naivety and
sophistication in terms of consumer behavior. A naive consumer erroneously expects to be
time-consistent in the future, meaning that he/she may have an incentive to revise the con-
sumption plan in each subsequent period, whereas a sophisticated consumer recognizes that
the self-control problem also arises in future periods and implements a plan that his/her
future selves will follow. We ﬁnd that publicly provided health care to the young generation
is welfare improving under optimal income taxation, if the consumers have present-biased
preferences and are naive; a result which applies independently of whether the mimicker is
crowded out before the low-ability type or vice versa. The intuition is that quasi-hyperbolic
discounting leads the consumer to spend too little resources on health care, while naivety
means that the policy incentives are not distorted by strategic consumer behavior. With
sophistication, on the other hand, the young consumer acts strategically vis-a-vis his/her
middle-aged self which may, in turn, either increase or decrease the demand for health care
as young. If the strategic incentives contribute to reduce the demand for private health care
among the young, then the policy incentives underlying public provision are analogous to
those under naivety. However, if the strategic consumer behavior increases the demand for
health care, public provision to the young generation is not necessarily welfare improving.
The policy incentives for public provision of health care services to the middle-aged gen-
eration diﬀer from those described above. We ﬁnd that public provision to the middle-aged is
welfare improving if the young generation is crowded out before the middle-aged generation.
25Furthermore, this result holds independently of whether the consumers are naive or sophis-
ticated, as this distinction only aﬀects the incentives facing the young generation (which is
already crowded out by assumption). If the middle-aged are crowded out ﬁrst, there will be
a counteracting eﬀect following as the young may reduce their own private consumption of
health care in response to the anticipated policy-induced increase when middle-aged.
We interpret our results to provide a strong case for publicly provided health care to the
young and the middle-aged. Public provision to the young leads by itself (most likely) to
higher welfare as well as increases the likelihood that the conditions for welfare improving
public provision to the middle-aged are fulﬁlled (by crowding out the private demand for
health care among the young).
Future research may take several directions, and we brieﬂy discuss two of them here. First,
the degree to which the preferences are "present-biased" may not only vary over productivity
types (as we assume here); it may also vary in other dimensions. Such a change of assumption
is likely to aﬀect the policy incentives underlying publicly provided private goods (as well
as the use of other policy instruments). Second, real world tax instruments may diﬀer from
those assumed here; for instance, a linear capital income tax makes the government unable
to perfectly control the capital stock. In that case, public provision might also serve as an
indirect instrument to aﬀect the savings behavior. We leave these extensions for future study.
5 Appendix
Labor Supply and Savings Behavior by the Young Consumer




















































































































First Order Conditions for the Government
















































− g0,s − g1,s













































































0,s + g0,s)δ + g1,s+1
￿￿
. (A3)
Instead of substituting the conditional commodity demand functions into the objective
27function, we have followed the equivalent approach of introducing the conditional commodity
demand function for one of the two goods, x, as separate restrictions. Then, by using c = b−x,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































1,t+1 = 0 (A19)
∂L
∂Kt+j
= −γt+j−1 + γt+j(1 + rt+j) = 0 for j = 1,2. (A20)
Welfare Eﬀects of Public Provision
If the income taxes are optimal, i.e. the ﬁrst order conditions given by equations (A4)-(A20)
are fulﬁlled, the welfare eﬀect of increased public provision of health care services to the











































































































































































Then, use equations (A14), (A15) and (A16) to solve for µ1
0,t, µ2
0,t and ˆ µ
1
0,t, respectively, and






















































































































































































































Finally, use equations (A17), (A18) and (A19) to solve for µ1
1,t+1, µ2
1,t+1 and ˆ µ
1
1,t+1, respec-



























































































































































































By analogy, the welfare eﬀect of public provision of health care services to the middle-aged



















































Equation (43) can then be derived in the same general way as equation (36). To derive
equation (43), solve equation (A7) for γt+1 and substitute into equation (A25). Then, use
equations (A14), (A15) and (A16) to solve for µ1
0,t, µ2
0,t and ˆ µ
1
0,t, respectively, and substitute
into the equation derived in the ﬁrst step. Finally, in the new equation, substitute for
µ1
1,t+1, µ2
1,t+1 and ˆ µ
1
1,t+1 by using equations (A17), (A18) and (A19), and rearrange to
obtain equation (43).
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